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1980s. We show that, since this time, the high yield spread has had significant explanatory power for the
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and   the   Federal   Funds rate. We conjecture that changes in the conduct of monetary policy   over   time   may
account   for   the   reduced   informativeness   of   these   alternative   indicators,   all   of  which are tied closely to
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Until the early 1980s only the highest quality ﬁrms could issue marketable debt. By the
middle1980s,however, amarketemerged forcorporatebondswithbelowinvestmentgrade
ratings. Firms thattraditionallydid not havetheﬁnancial strengthto ﬂoat marketablebonds
were now able to do so. The types of debt instruments they now issue are kindly known as
“high yield bonds” (and unkindly known as “junk bonds.”)1
In this paper we explore the information content that the spread between the high yield
bond rate and the corresponding safe interest rate has for business cycle activity. Our
motives are two-fold. First, as we discuss later, this spread may be a potentially good
measureofoverallﬁnancial conditions. Inthisrespect, itmayofferawaytodetectevidence
of theroleof credit market frictions in theampliﬁcation and propagationofbusiness cycles,
along the lines suggested by the recent theoretical work on the ﬁnancial accelerator2.
Second, from both a forecasting and policy standpoint, there is on-going interest in ex-
ploring the information content of ﬁnancial indicators.3 These variables are well measured
and available in real time. Some standard indicators which have performed well through
the middle 1980s, particularly the commercial paper/T-bill spread and the term spread, ap-
pear to have lost considerable forecasting power in recent years.4 The same has been true
for simple indicators of monetary policy, such as the Federal Funds rate. In this context, it
is interesting to explore the forecasting performance of the high yield spread as compared
to these other indicators. To be sure, as we discuss below, we are skeptical of the value
of heavy reliance on any single indicator. On the other hand, if the caveats are clearly
understood, a ﬁnancial indicator can have a potentially useful role in a policy-maker’s in-
formation set. At a minimum, further, the kinds of forecasting exercises we undertake here
can yield insights into the nature of the business cycle and (as we discuss) the role that
monetary policy has played.
To help interpret the empirical work that follows, Section 2 outlines the theory of the
ﬁnancial accelerator. We argue that the relevant measure of ﬁnancial conditions that the
theory suggests is the premium for external funds, i.e., the spread between the cost of
obtaining external ﬁnance and the opportunity cost of internal ﬁnance. We then argue that
the high yield bond spread may provide a reasonable measure of this premium.
Section 3 explores the marginal explanatory power of the high yield bond spread for
cyclical activity. The measure of the cycle we use is the log difference between real gross
domestic output and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce’s measure of potential output. We
show that since the middle 1980s the high yield bond spread has had signiﬁcant marginal
explanatory power for the output gap, both statistically and quantitatively. We next show
in section 4 that over this period, the explanatory power of the high yield bond spread
1For descriptions of the high yield bond market see Helwege and Kleiman (1997) and Milken (1999).
2Bernanke and Gertler (1989) describe the ﬁnancial accelerator. For a recent survey of the literature, see
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998.)
3See, for example, Estrella and Mishkin (1998).
4See Dotsey (1999) on the recent performance of the term spread and Friedman and Kuttner (1998) on
the recent performance of the paper-bill spread.
1dominates that of the two currently popular indicators, the term spread and the commercial
paper/ T-bill spread. We base our conclusions on both an analysis of in-sample ﬁt and of
out-of-sample forecasts. We conclude that the results are suggestive of both the strong role
that ﬁnancial factors have played in recent times and also of the change in the role that
monetary policy played in the most recent recession, as compared to previous downturns.
Section 5 examines the explanatory power of the high yield bond spread relative to
some leading candidate driving forces of the economy, including oil shocks and monetary
policy shocks. Again, the high yield bond spread appears to have superior explanatory
power, both from a statistical and quantitative standpoint. One interesting side result is
that, beginning in the early 1980s, the impact of monetary policy shocks on real GDP
seems to vanish. We interpret this ﬁnding as corroborative of our argument in Section 3
that the traditional ﬁnancial indicators (the term spread and the commercial paper/T-bill
spread) may have suffered a reduction in explanatory power due to a recent change in the
role that monetary policy plays in the business cycle. Section 6 contains some concluding
remarks about how to interpret our overall ﬁndings.
2 The Financial Accelerator and the Premium for Ex-
ternal Funds: A Guide for Interpreting Cyclical Move-
ments in the High Yield Bond Spread
The banking and corporate debt crises experienced by a number of industrialized coun-
tries from the late 1980s to the early 1990s along with the more severe versions that have
occurred in Japan and many emerging market economies have reawakened economists to
the idea that ﬁnancial market conditions may play an important role in shaping aggre-
gate economic activity. At the same time, over the last decade, theoretical macroeconomic
frameworkshaveevolvedthatcharacterize explicitlyhowﬁnancial factors mayamplifyand
propagate business cycles. This mechanism is known as the “ﬁnancial accelerator.” More
recently, models that feature a ﬁnancial accelerator have developed to the point where they
are now useful for providing a quantitative assessment of how much this mechanism might
contribute to explaining aggregate ﬂuctuations.5
While macroeconomics models that emphasize a ﬁnancial accelerator often differ in
details, they also contain several common elements6: First, there is some friction present
in the ﬁnancial market (e.g., asymmetric information or costs of contract enforcement) that
introduces a wedge between the cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of internal
funds, termed “the premium for external funds.” Second, this premium is an endogenous
5See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998) and the references therein.
6See Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (forthcoming)for a formal deriva-
tion of the ﬁnancial accelerator. The latter use a dynamic New Keynesian model as the baseline macroeco-
nomic framework. One could also obtain qualitatively similar results using the larger scale model developed
by Muellbauer (1996).
2variable and depends inversely on the balance sheet strength of the borrower. Finally, bor-
rowers’ ﬁnancial positions depend positively on aggregate economic activity (e.g. in a
boom, asset values and cash ﬂows rise relative to debt, and vice-versa in a downturn). The
procyclical behaviorin borrowers’ ﬁnancial positionsin turn impliescountercyclicalmove-
ment in the premium for external funds. This countercyclical movement in the premium
serves to amplify borrower spending and hence overall aggregate activity, relative to the
case of frictionless ﬁnancial markets. It is in this general way that the ﬁnancial accelerator
works.
The econometric evidence in support of the ﬁnancial accelerator consists mainly of nu-
merous panel data studies that demonstrate that liquidity constraints impinge on the behav-
ior of both ﬁrms and consumers at the individual level7. Though not without controversy,
these studies point to considerable evidence that ﬁnancial market frictions matter at the
individual level (i.e. that a premium for external ﬁnance exists and has on operative effects
on real economic decisions). At the same time, direct empirical evidence of the importance
of ﬁnancial accelerator at the aggregate level has been harder to detect.
In addition to the usual problem of endogeneity that hampers any evaluation of aggre-
gate data, there is the additional complication that the central economic variable at the core
of the cyclical mechanism that these theories stress - the premium for external funds - is
not easy to observe. More precisely, as we argue, until the development of the market for
high yield debt, plausible indicators of this premium did not exist.
Ideally, one would like an indicator of the premium that is market determined. The
problem here, as we have noted, is that until the early 1980s only the highest quality bor-
rowers (speciﬁcally, investment grade ﬁrms) have been able to issue market debt. These
types of ﬁrms experience relatively few obstacles in obtaining external ﬁnance. Hence,
the spread they pay (relative to safe debt) is not going to help detect an operative ﬁnancial
accelerator. Firms that face the kind of ﬁnancial market frictions that the theory describes
have traditionally relied heavily on commercial banks for external ﬁnance. However, the
only available bank rate (for use in aggregate time series analysis) is the prime lending rate.
The latter, unfortunately is a posted rate. An additional complication is that bank loans of-
ten contain non-price terms that are not directly quantiﬁable. Thus, even if the prime were
a market rate, it would still not accurately reveal the premium for external ﬁnance.
The development of the market for below investment grade debt has, among other
things, opened up the possibilityof obtaining a plausiblemeasure of the premium for exter-
nal ﬁnance. The rate on high yield bonds is clearly market determined. Further, the ﬁrms
that obtain funds in this market are precisely the kind that face the type of frictions in the
credit market that the theory describes. It is true that these ﬁrms reﬂect only a portion of
those with imperfect access to credit. The rest obtain funds from commercial banks and
other types of intermediaries. However, it is likely to be the case that over the cycle, the
spread on high yield debt is closely correlated with the premium on external funds that
these purely bank-dependent ﬁrms face. In this respect, the spread on high yield bonds
might provide a good overall indicator of the external ﬁnance premium for the broad class
7For a recent survey of the literature see Hubbard (1998).
3of ﬁrms with imperfect credit access.
To be clear, the spread could be a leading indicator even if capital markets were per-
fect, since it incorporates expectations of future default. However, the ﬁnancial accelerator
theory suggests that, everything else equal, the spread is likely to have greater marginal
forecasting power for real activity than otherwise. The reason is that, under this theory,
disturbances that orginate in the ﬁnancial sector can affect the real economy, in contrast to
the perfect markets paradigm. The high yield bond spread, in turn, is likely to incorporate
these disturbances.8
In the next section, we explore the explanatory power of the high yield spread. The
interpretation we give is that it provides a reasonable measure of ﬁnancial conditions, as
we have just outlined9. We also provide some evidence to support this interpretation.
3 The High Yield Bond Spread and the Output Gap: Em-
pirical Analysis
Figure 1 presents plots of two candidate high yield bond spreads at the quarterly frequency
over the period 1980:1 - 1999:1. The solid line is the difference between the high yield
bond rate and the corresponding rate for the highest quality ﬁrms (AAA rated). The dotted
line is the difference between the high yield rate and the rate on ten year Treasury Bonds.
Overall both spreads move closely together. As it turns out, our empirical results do not
depend on which spread we use.
We have a mild preference for the high yield/ AAA spread, for the following reason:
The spread between the AAA rate and the ten year government bond rate can gyrate tem-
porarily due to liquidity problems in the bond market. These gyrations, in turn, translates
into shifts in the high yield/ government bond spread that are unrelated to the underly-
ing quality of the ﬁrms in the market. This kind of phenomenon occurred recently during
the default on Russian bonds. As Figure 1 illustrates, there was a sharp rise in the high
yield/ government bond spread, but it was mainly due to an increase in the AAA/ten year
government that came about as a result of the ﬂight into government bonds. Because the
ﬁrms in the corporate bond market had the option of obtaining short term bank loans to
meet any funding needs, this “liquidity-induced” rise in corporate spreads had little impact
on aggregate activity. The high yield/ AAA spread is largely immune to these transitory
liquidity disruptions and is thus our preferred measure. We accordingly report results for
8Though we do not report the results here, a simple indicator of default risk for high grade borrowers,
the BAA-AAA spread, has much less marginal forecasting power than the high yield bond spread. Thus, the
possibility that the high yield bond spread is more sensitive to overall ﬁnancial conditions (since it involves
the market for below investment grade ﬁrms) might account for its greater marginal forecasting power, along
the lines we have suggested.
9Mishkin (1991) early on advocated the use of a market determined interest rate spread to gauge ﬁnancial
market conditions. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) similarly argue in favor of a spread that could proxy the
premium for external ﬁnance. They also provide a critique of the use of credit aggregates to proxy ﬁnancial
conditions.
4this measure, though it is fair to say that the results change little when we use the other
measure.
Note also that until the mid-1980s most of the outstanding high yield debt consisted of
bonds that were initially investment grade but received a downgrade in rating during the
1980-82 recessionary period.10 Beginning in the middle 1980s, however, most of the debt
in the market was issued originally by below investment grade ﬁrms. For this reason we
focus on a sampleperiod that beginsin 1985:1, thoughwe also present results for the whole
sample.
As Figure 1 shows, both spreads rise sharply in anticipation of the 1990-92 downturn.
In addition, the spreads are lower in the recent period of robust growth (middle to late
1990s) than in the mid-1980s period of more modest growth. The informal picture then is
that there is a strong inverse relation between the high yield spread and aggregate activity,
at least since the mid-1980s. Even in the early 1980s, when the high yield market was
not well developed (and consisted mainly of ﬁrms near investment grade), there was an
upward spike in the spread during the recession, though it was less dramatic than what
occurred during 1989-92.
We next supplement this informal analysis with some formal statistics. Figure 2 reports
the cross-correlation of the high yield spread with the output gap (the log difference of real
GDP and the CBO measure of potential output), for both the 1985:1-1999:1 sample and
the 1980:1-1999:1 sample.11 The results suggest that since 1985 there has been a strong
inverse relation between the high yield spread and the output gap. Further the high yield
spread clearly leads movements in output by one to two years. The high yield spread six
quarters lagged, for example, has a correlation of
￿0
:8 with the current output gap. A
similar pattern holds for the full sample, though not as pronounced as in the sub-sample.
To next ascertain the marginal information in the high yield bond spread, we regress
the output gap on four lags of itself and four lags of the spread. We consider two different
speciﬁcations. In theﬁrst, thedependent variableis theoutputgap onequarterahead. In the
second, it is the output gap one year ahead. The former speciﬁcation allows us to consider
the information content in the spread for near term cyclical behavior while the latter allows
us to consider the information content for the medium term.
Table1presentstheresultsforeach speciﬁcation overthetwosampleperiods. Reported
are (i) exclusion tests of the null hypothesis that the high yield spread contains no marginal
information and (ii) the sum of the coefﬁcients on the high yield spread along with tests of
the null that this sum is zero. Over the 1985:1-1999:1 sample, we strongly reject the null
hypotheses that the spread contains no marginal information for both the quarter ahead and
year ahead speciﬁcation. The sum of the coefﬁcients are negative and statistically different
from zero, sothat thespread notonly predictsbut predicts inthedirection wewould expect:
i.e., controlling for the lagged output gap, a rise in the spread signals a decline in the future
output gap. Similar results appear for the year ahead speciﬁcation over the full sample.
The spread is not signiﬁcant in the quarter ahead case, however. Thus, the strong relation
10These downgraded bonds are known in the market as “fallen angels.”
11Note that both the output gap and the high yield spread are stationary random variables.
5between the spread and cyclical activity really begins in the middle 1980s, as the earlier
descriptive analysis suggests.12
To gauge whether movements in the spread matter quantitatively for movements in the
output gap, we estimate a simple bivariate vector autoregression (VAR). We use four lags
of each variable and order the spread last (i.e. we assume that movements in the output gap
may haveacontemporaneousimpact onthespread butnot vice-versa.). Figure3 reports the
effect of a one standard deviation increase in the yield spread. The error bands represent
two standard deviation conﬁdence intervals. As the ﬁgure shows, an unanticipated one
standarddeviationriseinthespread leadstoasigniﬁcantdeclineinoutput, bothstatistically
and economically.
The interpretation we wish to give to the link between movements in the spread and the
outputgapisthat itis symptomaticoftheﬁnancial accelerator at work. To besure, sincethe
evidence is based on a reduced form system, the impulse response does not yield any kind
of precise quantitative estimate of this mechanism. What it does say is that some kind of
shock that is orthogonal to the current output gap and manifests itself in an increase in the
high yield spread does have a signiﬁcant effect on the path of aggregate real activity. Thus
while the evidence is not deﬁnite proof of a quantitatively important ﬁnancial accelerator,
it is certainly compatible with this scenario.
Figure 4 presents some further descriptive evidence in support of the notion that an
operative ﬁnancial accelerator underlies the co-movement between the high yield spread
and the output gap. The top panel shows that movements in the high yield spread are
closely related to the net interest burden that non-ﬁnancial corporations face. The latter is
the ratio of interest payments to interest plus cash ﬂow. It is a simple (inverse) measure of
ﬁrms’ balance sheet strength. As we noted, the theory underlying the ﬁnancial accelerator
suggests an inverse relation between balance sheet strength and the premium for external
funds. The co-movement between the high yield spread and the net interest burden is
consistent with this scenario.
Particularly striking is the simultaneous sharp rise in both variables during the late
12As we have noted, the salient feature of the data is the very sharp rise in the high yield spread in late
1989 that preceded the 1990-91 recession, the only signiﬁcant dowturn in the sample. While it is perfectly
legitimate to exploit the variation in the data that comes from this single epsiode, it is nonetheless useful
to know whether this event accounts for all the explanatory power of the high yield spread for the output
gap. To get at this issue, we re-estimated the forecasting equation for the output gap, this time allowing the
coefﬁcients to switch (at all lags) on the ﬁve observations on the spread between 1989Q:4 and 1990Q:4. In
effect, we identify the explanatory the spread that remains after removing the ﬁve largest observations in the
sample. Overall, the explanatory power of the high yield spread for the output gap a year ahead is largely
unaffected by this exercise. In particular, for the year ahead regression, the p-value for the joint signiﬁcance
of the spread is 0
:03 for the full sample and 0
:00 for the restricted sample. Further, the sum of the coefﬁcients











changes from the benchmark case reported in Figure 1. For the quarter ahead case, however, the high yield
spread does not add signiﬁcant marginal predictive power in the restricted sample. However, the sum of the
coefﬁcients remains signiﬁcantly negative. In summary, the 1990-91recession alone does not account for the
explanatory power of the spread for the year ahead output gap, but does seem to matter a great deal for the
quarter ahead case.
61980s. A combination of events contributed to the rise in the net interest burden over this
period: (i)thedevelopmentofthehighyieldbondmarket, (ii)tighteningofmonetarypolicy
(i.e. increased short term interest rates) and (iii) a weakening of corporate cash ﬂows due
to the tightening and other factors. It is exactly this kind of scenario that should produce a
rise in the premium for external funds that, in turn, has an overall dampening effect on the
economy. The co-movement between the net interest burden, the high yield spread and the
output gap are certainly consistent with this interpretation of events. It is also of interest to
observe that during the recent period of high growth, the net interest burden is low and so
too is the high yield spread. Again, the broad picture aligns with the notion of an operative
ﬁnancial accelerator.
The premium for external funds should also be related to conditions in banking. Weak-
ness in bank balance sheets impedes the ability of these institutions to intermediate funds.
The net effect is to constrain the overall supply of funds to ﬁrms with imperfect access
to credit and thereby raise the premium for external funds. The bottom panel in Figure
4 compares the movement in the high yield spread to the condition of bank capital asset
ratios from 1984:1 through 1999:1. The low capital asset ratio at the beginning of the
period reﬂects the consequences of the risk-taking encouraged by the deregulation of the
ﬁnancial services industry that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This deregula-
tion was not accompanied by a prudent adjustment of the (regulatory) ﬁnancial safety net.
As a consequence, many banks became highly levered and at the same time ventured into
increasingly risky types of loans. The combination of poor capitalization and a risky loan
portfolio left many of these institutionsheavily exposed to the shocks that followed, includ-
ing the defaults on LDC debt and the collapse of oil and real estate prices. The net effect
was a serious decline in bank capitalization. Accompanying this decline in capital was a
sharp rise in the high yield spread, in line with the theory of the ﬁnancial accelerator.13
Interestingly, the low spread that has prevailed in recent times is accompanied by strength
in not only non-ﬁnancial corporate balance sheets, but bank balance sheets as well.
Finally, the bottom panel also plots the information on the terms of bank lending from
the senior loan ofﬁcers’ survey.14 The gap from 1984 to 1990 reﬂects the fact that the
survey was brieﬂy discontinued over this period. However, the available data shows that
periods where the terms of credit tightened are associated with upward movements in the
high yield spread. In this respect the high yield spread appears to be a good measure of
overall ﬁnancial conditions as we conjectured.
13For a discussion of the problems in banking during the 1980s and the impact these problems had on the
real economy, see Bernanke and Lown (1991).
14For a analysis of the forecasting value of the information in the loan ofﬁcer’s survey, see Lown, Morgan
and Rohatgi (1999).
74 A Comparison with Other Spreads
In this section we compare the explanatory performance of the high yield spread to the
two leading alternatives: the commercial paper/T-bill spread and the term spread (ten year
governmentbond minus one year bond.) Each of these spreads has been a reliable indicator
of economic activity for most of the time since the early 1970s, but each has declined in
performance over the last decade.15
Traditional use of ﬁnancial information for forecasting emphasized monetary aggre-
gates, following the lead of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). As suggested by Goodhart’s
law, attempts to target monetary aggregates in the early 1980s led to a decline in their fore-
casting power. Financial innovation (which induced ﬂuctuations in velocity) also caused
the statistical relation between money and output to deteriorate.
In response to the poor predictive performance of monetary aggregates, Friedman and
Kuttner (1992, 1993) originally proposed examining the predictive power of the paper-
bill spread. They showed that this indicator had strong predictive power up through the
mid-1980s. For similar reasons, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin
(1998) proposed the term spread. This variable also worked very well over a similar time
period.
In our view, the performance of each of these indicators is tied closely to monetary
policy. In particular, each of these spreads movessharply in periods of signiﬁcant monetary
tightening. For example, during periods of sharp increases in the Federal Funds rate, the
paper-bill spread has widened signiﬁcantly and the term spread has become signiﬁcantly
negative (i.e, the yield curve has become inverted.) The widening of the paper-bill spread
is associated with a surge in money market instruments, including commercial paper and
CDs that has typically accompanied a monetary tightening: the surge of these instruments
on the market temporarily depresses their price.16 The negative movement in the term
spread simply reﬂects that the monetary tightening is inducing a rise in near term short
rates relative to future short term rates.
To the extent that these indicators are connected with monetary policy, then it is un-
derstandable why they might perform well through the middle 1980s. As a number of
economist have noted, monetary tightening to curtail inﬂation was an important feature of
each of the recessions from the late 1960s through the early 1980s. In this vein, since a
sharp monetary tightening did not precede the most recent downturn (1990-92), it is un-
derstandable that these indicators did not forecast real activity to the same degree as in the
past.
Figure 5 presents cross-correlations of each of these indicators with the output gap. To
illustrate the change in the cyclical pattern of each of these indicators over time, we plot
results for the two samples: 1980:1 - 1999:1 and 1985:1-1999:1. Note that the former
includes the period of monetary policy tightening under Volcker. For the full sample, the
15See Stock and Watson (forthcoming) for a general description of the cyclical pattern of interest rate
spreads.
16See Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993), Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and Gertler (1993).
8patterns are consistent with the idea that the indicators are capturing policy tightening. In
particular, the current output gap is negatively correlated with lagged values of the paper-
bill spread, implying that a rise in the spread (perhaps induced by a policy tightening)
signals a subsequent decline in output. In a similar spirit, over the full sample, the output
gap is positivelycorrelated with lagged values of the term spread: Accordingly, a decline in
the term spread (again, perhaps induced by a policy tightening) signals a decline in output.
Note, however, that for both indicators, the cross-correlation with the output gap
changes dramatically when we movefrom the full sample to the sub-period 1985:1-1999:1.
Again, the resultsare consistentwith theinterpretation that theseindicatorsare tied to mon-
etary policy. The absence of a monetary policy-induced contraction in output on the scale
of the early Volcker disinﬂation appears to account for the breakdown in the lead-lag rela-
tion observed over the full sample.
We explore the issue further by considering some simple “horse races” of the high yield
spread against each of the alternative spreads. In each case, we regress the output gap on
four lags each of output gap, the high yield spread and one of the alternative indicators. We
consider both quarter ahead and year ahead estimates. We also estimate over the 1980:1-
1999:1 sample and the 1985:1-1999:1 sample.
Table 2 presents the results from exclusion tests of the high yield spread versus the
alternative indicator. The numbers in the table are p-values for the null that the particular
spread has no information for the output gap. Over the full sample (which, again, includes
the Volcker disinﬂation) the term spread appears to dominate. It is a statistically signiﬁcant
predictorof theoutput gap after controllingfor thehigh yield spread, for both quarter ahead
and year ahead forecasts. The high yield spread in this case is signiﬁcant only for the year
ahead forecast. The paper-bill spread over this sample is signiﬁcant only for the quarter
ahead forecast. The reverse is true for the high yield spread in this case.
The results change, however, for the 1985:1-1996:1 sample. In this case, the high yield
spread has more reliable marginal explanatory power for the output gap than either the
paper-bill spread or the term spread. When run against either alternative indicator, the high
yield spread remains a statistically signiﬁcant predictor of the output gap. This result holds
for both the quarter ahead and year ahead estimates of the output gap. Interestingly, the
term spread has no signiﬁcant marginal explanatory power for the output gap over this
period. The paper-bill spread is signiﬁcant for the year ahead forecast.
We explore the issue further by considering the ability of each spread to aid in out-of-
sample forecasts for the output gap. Speciﬁcally, we consider a set of bivariate regressions
of the output gap on four lags each of the output gap and the respective spread. For bench-
mark purposes, wealso estimatea univariaterelation ofthe outputgap on fourlags of itself.
Again, we consider both quarter ahead and year ahead estimates of the output gap.
We ﬁrst estimate the equation over the period 1985:1 through 1996:1 for the quarter
ahead case, and stop a year earlier (1995:1) for the year ahead case. We next generate a
forecast for each case (in the quarter ahead case the ﬁrst forecast is for 1996:2 and in the
year ahead case it is for 1996:1.) We then move forward one quarter, re-estimate the model
(overthe sample1985:1- 1996:2, for thequarter ahead case and 1985:1-1995:2for the year
9ahead case) and then generate a new set of forecasts. We continue this algorithm through
the end of the sample.
Figure 6 presents the results for the quarter ahead forecasts and Figure 7 for the year
ahead. The top panel in each ﬁgure plots the ex post behavior of GDP against the forecast
from the univariate case. Note that in each instance the univariate model systematically
underpredicts.
The bottom panel reports the out-of-sample results for each of the bivariate models.
Interestingly, the high yield spread signiﬁcantly improves both the quarter ahead and year
ahead forecast of the output gap. The forecast in each case tightly overlaps the realized
value. On the other hand, neither the paper-bill spread nor the term spread is particularly
helpfulforpredictingtheoutputgapoverthisperiod. Asintheunivariatecase, theforecasts
systematically underpredict the output gap.
From a variety of standpoints, accordingly, since the mid 1980s the high yield spread
has been a more reliable indicator of cyclical activity than either the paper-bill spread or
the term spread.
5 Oil Shocks and Monetary Policy
We next compare the marginal information in the high yield spread to several other vari-
ables that reﬂect potentially important forces that affect the economy: the real price of oil
and several indicators of the stance of monetary policy. As in the previous section, we run
a simple horse race of the high yield spread against an alternative, based on a projection of
the output gap on lagged values of itself, the high yield spread and the alternative variable.
The ﬁrst alternative we consider is the real price of oil. Hamilton (1983) and others
have argued that oil shocks have been a central driving force of the business cycle. The
question then arises as to whether the high yield spread might be capturing information
about this shock. On the surface this seems unlikely because the high yield spread rose
well in advance of the 1990 oil shock associated with the war in Kuwait (see Figure 1).17
Table 3 presentsresults that bearout thisconjecture. The toptwo rows present resultsof
exclusionstestsforthehighyieldspread andtherealpriceofoilrespectively. Asbefore, the
number presented is the p-value for the null that the variable in question is not signiﬁcant in
the trivariate regression equation for the output gap. Over the full sample, 1980:1 -1999:1,
the real oil price is signiﬁcant and the high yield spread is not. Note that this sample
captures the inﬂuence of not only the 1990 oil shock on output, but the 1979 shock as well.
It also includes the period 1980:1-1985:1 where the high yield bond market was not well
developed.
The results change, however, when we restrict attention to the 1985:1 -1999:1 period.
The high yield spread is now signiﬁcant, and strongly signiﬁcant for the year ahead fore-
cast. Oil prices are only marginally signiﬁcant for the year ahead forecast of the output gap.
17One qualiﬁcation is that the high yield market may have anticipated the problems in Kuwait. Investigat-
ing this issue is beyond the scope of the paper.
10Thus movements in the high yield spread over this period contain signiﬁcant information
for output that is independent of movements in oil prices.
It is important to note that even if oil prices had eliminated the explanatory power of
the high yield spread, it is still the case that a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism could have
been at work over this period. The triggering force in this case would have been the oil
shock. That is, to the extent that rising oil prices weakened ﬁrm ﬁnancial positions, the
ﬁnancial accelerator could have served to magnify the direct affect of oil prices on real
activity. However, since oil prices do not eliminate the explanatory power of the high yield
spread, we are left with the possibility that disturbances other than oil shocks may have
triggered the ﬁnancial accelerator.
We next turn attention to indicators of monetary policy. We consider two: the broad
aggregate M2 (speciﬁcally, the growth rate) and the Federal Funds rate, as proposed orig-
inally by Bernanke and Blinder (1992). Endogeneity problems make M2 a questionable
indicator of the stance of policy. We nonetheless include it, given the tradition of analyzing
the predictive power of this aggregate (not to mention the interest of the new European
Central Bank in monetary aggregates). One issue is that in the simple trivariate regressions
we are not controlling for inﬂation. Thus, in addition to the nominal growth rate of M2
and the nominal Funds rate, we also consider real M2 growth and the ex post real Federal
Funds rate.
As Table3 shows,the monetary indicatorstend to do betteroverthefull sample1980:1-
1999:1 than over the restricted sample that begins in 1985:1. The high yield bond spread
dominatesM2overeach period. As wehavenoted, however,M2 is aquestionableindicator
of the stance of monetary policy.
The Federal Funds rate, on the other hand is highly signiﬁcant over the full sample. In
this case, the high yield spread is signiﬁcant only for the year ahead forecast. However, the
situation more than reverses when we restrict attention to the 1985:1-1999:1 sub-period.
Here the high yield spread is signiﬁcant for both the quarter ahead and year ahead forecast
of output. The Funds rate, on the other hand is insigniﬁcant in both cases.
Overall, the results are consistent with those obtained in the previous section, to the
extent that the paper-bill spread and the term spread are closely tied to the stance of mon-
etary policy. That is, the Federal Funds rate has highly signiﬁcant marginal information
only when we include the period of the Volcker policy tightening, as was the case with the
paper-bill and term spreads.
It should be clear that the results do not suggest that monetary policy has become unim-
portant in recent years. Rather they imply only that the “non-systematic” movements in
policy have become less important, so that the marginal information for aggregate activity
contained in indicators tied closely to monetary policy has diminished.18 The same, how-
ever, is not true for the high yield spread, which seems to contain signiﬁcant information
for the output gap that is not available from the lagged output or other leading indicators.
To explore this issue further, we consider the effects of orthogonalized shocks to the
18See Bernanke, Gerter, and Watson (1997) for an analysis of the problem of identifying the systematic
versus non-systematic component of monetary policy.
11Funds rate versus the high yield spread. We begin by noting the change in the impact of the
Funds after the early 1980s. In particular, we considera simplequarterly VAR that includes
four lags of the Federal Funds rate along with the logs of real GDP, the real GDP deﬂator,
and an index of commodity prices. This kind of system is the simplest that has been used
to analyze the impact of monetary policy shocks.19
To identify a shock to monetary policy, we order the Funds rate last in the VAR. Figure
8 then portrays the impulse responses to a positive shock to the Funds rate, for the two
samples 1979:4-1999:1 and 1985:1-1999:1. Over the long sample, the unanticipated rise
in the Funds rate has the conventional effect: Output and prices decline; and the effect
is statistically signiﬁcant. However, when we restrict attention to the shorter sample, the
impact of the Funds rate completely vanishes20. Again, we stress that this does not imply
that monetary policy has become unimportant, only that the non-systematiccomponent has
become less signiﬁcant. The longer sample incorporates the Volcker disinﬂation during
which there was an unusual rise in the Funds rate. The simple linear model interprets
this period as one of big positive shocks to the Funds rate, which helps account for the
overall impact of the orthogonalized shocks.21 The absence of high inﬂation post-1985
eliminated the need for any unusual tightening. In addition, as originally emphasized by
Taylor (1993), monetary policy under Greenspan has reacted in a very systematic way to
the economy. As a consequence it is only natural that monetary policy shocks should have
become less important.
Finally, we add the high yield bond spread to the VAR and order it last in the system.
Thus, we let monetary policy affect the spread within the period, but assume that the Fed is
not inﬂuenced by current innovations in the spread - though, it may certainly be inﬂuenced
by lagged movements in the spread. We then consider the impact of a positive shock to
the yield spread. Note that the shock has a signiﬁcant depressing effect on real output over
time. Thus, movements in the spread over this period that are orthogonal to output, prices
and the Funds rate have a signiﬁcant impact on aggregate activity. Again, the results are
consistent with there being an operative ﬁnancial accelerator during this era.
6 Conclusion
Our results indicate that the high yield bond spread contains statistically signiﬁcant and
quantitatively important information for aggregate economic activity since the time of the
19See Christiano,EichenbaumandEvans(1996)andBernankeandMihov(1998). Theauthorsalsoinclude
non-borrowed and total bank reserves in the model. Under the assumption that the Funds rate is the policy
instrument, however, adding reserves typically has little impact on model dynamics.
20Note that the results pertain to quarterly data. With monthly data it is possible to detect a signiﬁcant
effect of the Funds rate on industrial production, post-1985. However, the results typically are accompanied
by a “price puzzle” (i.e, a policy contraction produces a rise in prices), which makes questionable whether
the policy shock is properly identiﬁed.
21Clarida, Gali and Gertler (forthcoming) provide formal evidence of a signiﬁcant shift in the reaction
functon around the time of Volcker.
12development of the market for below-investment grade debt. This conclusion is based on
an analysis of both in-sample ﬁt and out-of-sample forecasts. One caveat is that the sample
period (1985:1-1999:1) is relatively short and includes only one major recession.22 On the
other hand, the high yield spread does considerably improve the out-of-sample forecast of
the recent behavior of the output gap, particularly relative to other ﬁnancial indicators.
We also argue that the high yield spread may be a good measure of overall ﬁnancial
conditions. In particular, it may be good proxy for the premium for external funds, a
variablethatplaysacentralroleintheﬁnancialaccelerator. Inthisvein, thecyclicalrelation
between the high yield spread and the output gap may be symptomatic of an operative
ﬁnancial accelerator, along the lines suggested by the theory.
Another key ﬁnding is that, since the middle 1985s, the high yield spread outperforms
the other leading ﬁnancial indicators of real economic activity, including the paper-bill
spread, thetermspreadandtheFederal Fundsrate. Aswediscussed,changesintheconduct
of monetary policy that have occurred since the early 1980s likely account for the reduced
informativeness of these alternative indicators, all of which are closely tied to monetary
policy.
A virtue of the high yield spread is that because it is extremely sensitive to default risk,
it may detect a greater varietyoffactors that inﬂuencethemacro-economy than do theother
indicators. This might explain why it was informative, in contrast to the other indicators,
over an era where monetary policy was not the central factor in the downturn.
Thus, there is the possibility that the high yield spread may prove to be a relatively
durable and useful indicator of economic activity. Several qualiﬁcations are in order, how-
ever: First, itis importantto keep in mind thattheinformativenessof anyﬁnancial indicator
is sensitive to the nature of the business cycle and, relatedly, to the conduct of monetary
policy. Attempts to adjust policy to target the indicator will reduce its informativeness, as
we know from Goodhart’s law. In a similar spirit, because the cyclical properties of the
indicator are likely sensitive to the monetary policy rule, basing policy explicitly on the
indicator may lead to problems of circularity, as emphasized by Woodford(1994).
Second, the predictive power of the spread is likely to hinge on the extent to which
ﬁnancial conditions in the high yield bond market are highly correlated with ﬁnancial con-
ditions in other credit markets, particularly the market for bank loans.23 We provided
informal evidence to show that this high correlation was present over the sample we exam-
ined, particularly during the recessionary period. Situations could arise, however, where
the spread might not acurately gauge overall credit conditions. For example, the recent rise
in the high yield bond spread was due in part to factors idiosyncratic to this market (i.e., the
Russian bond default) and not symptomatic of a systematic deterioration of credit condi-
22As we discussed earlier (see footnote 11), however, dummying out the observations on the high yield
spread over the period 1989:4-1990:4does not perceptivelyweaken the explanatorypower that the high yield
spread has for the output gap a year ahead.
23Thus, for example, even if direct bond ﬁnancing is small relative to bank ﬁnance, as for example is the
case in Europe today, the spread emerging from a liquid high yield market can still be informative about the
course of the overall economy, to the extent ﬁnancial conditions are correlated across markets.
13tions, of the kind that occurred in the late 1980s. In this recent episode, banks remained in
relativelygoodﬁnancial healthand, accordingly,were ina positiontosupplyfundsto offset
the disruption of the high yield market (with the support of an appropriately accommoda-
tive monetary policy)24. Similarly, Y2K problems could create idiosyncratic problems in
the high yield market that could mute the overall informativeness of the high yield spread.
What all this suggests, is that it may be desirable to develop a general economy-wide index
of ﬁnancial conditions, of which the high yield bond spread is one component.
24For a discussion of the substitution between bond and bank credit over this period, see Saidenberg and
Strahan (1999).
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17Table 1
Bivariate Regressions Predicting GDPGAP
Importance of High Yield – AAA Bond Spread
1981:Q1-1999:Q1 1986:Q1-1999:Q1
1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead 1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead
p-Value for
Joint Significance 0.14 0.00 0.02 0.00
Sum of Coefficients -0.001 -0.01 -0.002 -0.01
p-Value 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00Table 2
Trivariate Regressions Predicting GDPGAP
A. High Yield - AAA Bond Spread Relative to Commercial Paper - Treasury Bill
Spread
1981:Q1-1999:Q1 1986:Q1-1999:Q1
1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead 1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead
p-Value for
HYAAA 0.26 0.04 0.00 0.00
CPTBSP 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.00
B. High Yield – AAA Bond Spread Relative to the Term Spread
1981:Q1-1999:Q1 1986:Q1-1999:Q1
1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead 1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead
p-Value for
HYAAA 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.00
TERMSP 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.20Table 3
Trivariate Regressions Predicting GDPGAP
High Yield - AAA Bond Spread Relative to Oil Prices and
Monetary Policy Indicators
1981:Q1-1999:Q1 1986:Q1-1999:Q1
1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead 1 Quarter Ahead 1 Year Ahead
p-Value for
HYAAA 0.32 0.23 0.07 0.00
Real Oil Prices 0.58 0.00 0.97 0.09
HYAAA 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.00
Nom. M2 Growth 0.79 0.99 0.66 0.08
HYAAA 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00
Real M2 Growth 0.20 0.01 0.82 0.18
HYAAA 0.58 0.04 0.02 0.00
Nom. FF 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.22
HYAAA 0.58 0.04 0.02 0.00
Real FF 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.210
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Out of Sample Forecasts - 1 Quarter Ahead
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